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Quantum key distribution (QKD) allows for secure communications safe against attacks by quan-
tum computers. QKD protocols are performed by sending a sizeable, but finite, number of quantum
signals between the distant parties involved. Many QKD experiments however predict their achiev-
able key rates using asymptotic formulas, which assume the transmission of an infinite number of
signals, partly because QKD proofs with finite transmissions (and finite key lengths) can be difficult.
Here we develop a robust numerical approach for calculating the key rates for QKD protocols in
the finite-key regime in terms of two novel semi-definite programs (SDPs). The first uses the rela-
tion between smooth min-entropy and quantum relative entropy, and the second uses the relation
between the smooth min-entropy and quantum fidelity. We then solve these SDPs using convex
optimization solvers and obtain some of the first numerical calculations of finite key rates for several
different protocols, such as BB84, B92, and twin-field QKD. Our numerical approach democratizes
the composable security proofs for QKD protocols where the derived keys can be used as an input
to another cryptosystem.
INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD), until today, remains
the only quantum-resistant method of sharing secret keys
and transmitting future-proof secret information at a dis-
tance [1]. Even after more than 30 years of development,
QKD still does not see widespread adoption, primarily
due to practical and theoretical difficulties.
Practically, QKD as a means of encryption requires
a dramatic change to the existing classical fiber-optical
communication infrastructure. QKD systems typically
require the use of specialized quantum optical devices.
For example, some QKD protocols need single photon
detectors and dark fiber-optical channels without any
classical repeater device, e.g. erbium-doped fiber am-
plifiers. In other words, the need for significant change
to the current telecommunication infrastructure presents
a challenge to QKD’s wide-use today.
Theoretically, security proofs are typically compli-
cated, and the key rate derived can be loose due to lim-
ited availability of analytical proof techniques. Validat-
ing a published security proof is an equally complicated
task, and it is likely impractical to expect QKD users to
be capable of verifying the security of a protocol.
The security of any QKD protocol is guaranteed when
a detailed security analysis certifies that the protocol pro-
duces a non-zero secret key rate (in terms of either bits
per second or bits per transmission). So far, develop-
ment in key rate calculations have relied on analytical
tools that can be limited in scope to specific protocols.
In particular, oftentimes to simplify the analysis, the cal-
culations invoke a high degree of symmetry. Indeed,
for some protocols, such as the Bennett-Brassard 1984
(BB84) protocol [2] or the six-state protocol [3], analyt-
ical formulas for the key rates are known. However, in
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practical implementations of QKD, a lack of symmetry
is the norm rather than the exception as experimental
imperfections tend to break these symmetries [4]. This
motivates the need to develop a new method of analyzing
the security of QKD protocols that may lack structure.
Recently, [5] and [6] proposed two numerical techniques
to obtain reliable secret key rate bounds for an arbitrary
unstructured QKD protocol. The original technique, de-
scribed in [5], formulates the problem of calculating the
secret key rate in terms of a mathematical optimiza-
tion problem. Unfortunately, this original formulation
resulted in a non-convex problem. The method was im-
proved in [6], which formulates the key rate problem in
terms of convex optimization. Commercially available
convex optimization tools, such as Mosek [7], SeDuMi [8],
or SDPT3 [9], can therefore be used to reliably solve the
problem. Nevertheless, the problems formulated so far
still assumed that Alice and Bob have exchanged an infi-
nite number of signals (and an infinite key length), which
is practically impossible. In order to quantify the security
of realistic QKD protocols, a new problem that includes
the finite-key statistics of the QKD operations must be
formulated.
Here, we formulate the key rate problem in terms of
a novel semidefinite program (SDP) that considers the
practical case of only a finite number of transmitted sig-
nals. The program takes as inputs the measured statis-
tics from the parameter estimation step and outputs the
key rate as a function of the security parameter of the
protocol: εqkd. The SDP computes a reliable, achievable
lower bound on the actual value of the secret key rate.
As SDP is a convex optimization problem, we can solve
the problem using commercial solvers that often are able
to find the global optima. Our problem formulation is re-
liable, such that even if the solver fails to find the global
optimum, the SDP is guaranteed to output an achiev-
able secret key rate. Lastly, since the problem takes into
consideration the finite number of signals exchanged, the
2secret key guaranteed by the method is composable, i.e.
can be used as an input to another cryptosystem.
RESULTS
The key rate problem in the non-asymptotic regime
We describe the main steps of a typical QKD protocol
and take note of the relevant security parameters at each
step.
1. Transmission. A QKD protocol starts with the
transmission of quantum signals. Let us assume
that N signals are successfully distributed from Al-
ice to Bob. After this step, in the entanglement pic-
ture, they will share N entangled quantum states,
whose joint state can be described as ρAB. They
will then apply measurements to their respective
quantum states to obtain classical data.
2. Parameter estimation. Next, Alice and Bob per-
form parameter estimation where they reveal a ran-
dom sample of m signals through the public classi-
cal communication channel to estimate the statis-
tics of their data. Sifting is often (but not always)
also performed, in which Alice and Bob discard
those data where they have chosen a different mea-
surement basis. At this step, they are left with
n ≤ N −m number of signals, called the raw keys,
from which they can eventually generate secret
keys. Let us denote their raw keys by ZA and ZB,
both of which have the length |ZA| = |ZB| = n.
There is a small probability εPE that the raw keys
obtained are not compatible with the estimated pa-
rameters, and it is related to the number of signals
m that are used to estimate the relevant statistics
of the overall data. (Relevant security parameter:
εPE.)
3. Reconciliation. Alice and Bob then perform key
reconciliation (sometimes also referred to as error
correction). The key reconciliation step, in which
they correct for any possible error between their
raw keys, reveals leakEC number of bits. This error
correction step is performed with a certain failure
probability εEC, which is the probability that one
party computes the wrong guess of the other party’s
raw keys. (Relevant security parameter: εEC.)
4. Error verification. To ensure they have identical
raw keys, they apply a two-universal hash function
and publish ⌈log2 1/εcor⌉ bits of information. Here,
εcor = εhash, which is the probability two non-
identical raw secret keys generate the same hash
value. (Relevant security parameter: εcor.)
5. Privacy amplification. Next, they apply another
two-universal hash function (of different resulting
hash length than the previous one in the error ver-
ification step) to extract a shorter secret key pair
(SA,SB) of length |SA| = |SB| = ℓ. εPA measures
how close the output of the hash function, i.e. the
secret keys SA and SB are, from a uniform random
bit string conditioned on the eavesdropper’s, Eve’s,
knowledge. (Relevant security parameter: εPA.)
In this nonasymptotic regime, we use a generalization
of the von Neumann entropy called smooth min-entropy
which was developed by [10]. The main significance of
smooth min-entropy comes from the fact that it charac-
terizes the number of uniform bits that can be extracted
in the privacy amplification step of a QKD protocol.
Now, let us take E′ to be the information that Eve gath-
ered about Alice’s raw key ZA up to and including the
error correction and verification steps. When Alice and
Bob apply a two-universal hash function in the privacy
amplification step, they can then extract a εsec-secret key
of length:
ℓ = H ε¯min(ZA|E′)− 2 log2
1
2εPA
, (1)
for ε¯ + εPA ≤ εsec (Proof is by the Quantum leftover
hash lemma in Ref. [11]). H ε¯min(ZA|E′) is the conditional
smoothed min-entropy that quantifies the average prob-
ability that Eve guesses ZA correctly using her optimal
strategy based on her knowledge of the information E′.
During the error correction step, a maximum of leakEC
bits of information are revealed about ZA. Alice has to
send a syndrome bit string of length leakEC to Bob over
the public channel, so that Bob can correct his raw key to
match Alice’s. Furthermore, during the error verification
step, ⌈log2(1/εcor)⌉ ≤ log2(2/εcor) bits of information are
revealed. If we let E be the remaining quantum informa-
tion Eve has on ZA, then
H ε¯min(ZA|E′) ≥ H ε¯min(ZA|E)− leakEC − log2
2
εcor
. (2)
The QKD protocol is said to be εqkd ≥ εcor + εsec secure
if it is correct with a probability higher than 1− εcor and
is secret with a probability higher than 1− εsec.
The quantity H ε¯min(ZA|E) can be simplified in the case
of collective attacks, in which Alice and Bob share the
state of the form ρAB = (ρAB)
⊗N
. In this case, we can
also assume that ρZAE = (ρZAE)
⊗n
since all purifications
of ρAB are equivalent under a local unitary operation
by Eve, and there exists a purification with this prop-
erty [12]. In other words, after being presented with the
tensor product states (ρAB)
⊗N
, Eve is free to choose how
to purify this state. (She wants to purify this state be-
cause this gives her the most information.) One obvious
choice is to purify each transmission such that she has
|Ψ〉
ABE
= |ψ〉A1B1E1 ⊗ |ψ〉A2B2E2 ⊗ · · · ⊗ |ψ〉ANBNEN . It
is from such a purification, we obtain the tensor prod-
uct structure of ρZAE = (ρZAE)
⊗n
. The observed statis-
tics of relative detection frequencies, however, only gives
3some knowledge about the state ρZAE . Given that the
state ρZAE is contained within a set that contains all
ρZAE compatible with the observed statistics, except
with probability εPE, we have:
H ε¯min(ZA|E) ≥ Hεmin(ρ⊗nZAE |ρ⊗nE ), (3)
where ε¯ = ε+ εPE.
When the error correction step is performed with a
failure probability of εEC, i.e. the probability that Bob
computes the wrong guess for ZA, we can bound the
quantity leakEC with Corrollary 6.3.5 of [10]:
1
n
leakEC ≤ fECH(ZA|ZB) + log2(d+3)
√
3 log2(2/εEC)
n
,
(4)
where d is the number of possible symbols in ZA, and
fEC ≥ 1 characterizes the error correction (in)efficiency.
Commonly, fEC is chosen to be ∼ 1.2, which is based on
the performance of real codes [12].
To compute the key rate under the assumption of col-
lective attacks, we therefore have to minimize the quan-
tity:
min
ρAB∈CεPE
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
ZAE
|ρ⊗nE ) (5)
Here, the set CεPE is the set of all density operators ρAB
that are consistent with the statistics measured from
the parameter estimation step, except with a probabil-
ity εPE. Let Γi be the Hermitian observables for these
measurements, then the average values of these opera-
tors are within the bounds: γLBi ≤ Tr(ρABΓi) ≤ γUBi ,
for i = 1, . . . , nPE, except with probability εPE. Along
with the constraint that ρAB is a valid normalized den-
sity operator, i.e. ρAB  0 and Tr(ρAB) = 1, then ρAB
is constrained to be in the set:
CεPE ≡ {ρAB : ρAB  0, Tr(ρAB) = 1, and
γLBi ≤ Tr(ρABΓi) ≤ γUBi
for i = 1, . . . , nPE},
(6)
except with probability εPE.
To understand how one can obtain the bounds on the
average values γi ≡ Tr(ρABΓi), consider the parame-
ter estimation step in a typical QKD protocol. Alice
and Bob perform the measurements using the POVMs
{MaA } and {M bB } (in the entanglement-based picture)
and use a fraction of their measurements to obtain
γ(a,b) = Tr(ρABM
a
A⊗M bB). Then, we can make the iden-
tification Γi ≡ Γ(a,b) = MaA ⊗M bB with γi ≡ γ(a,b). To
find the relevant bounds, suppose that a total of mi sig-
nals have been used to estimate γi, then the deviation
of the estimate γmii from the ideal estimate γ
∞
i can be
quantified using the law of large numbers [12, 13]:
|γmii −γ∞i | ≤ ∆(mi, d) =
1
2
√
2 ln(1/εiPE) + d ln(mi + 1)
mi
,
(7)
except with a failure probability of εiPE. Here, d is the
number of outcomes of the POVM Γi needed to estimate
it (for error rates, d = 2 since the outcomes are either
Alice = Bob or Alice 6= Bob). The overall parameter
estimation step fails with a probability of εPE =
∑
i ε
i
PE.
We can then obtain the upper and lower bounds:
γUBi = min(γi +∆(mi), 1),
γLBi = max(γi −∆(mi), 0),
(8)
as γi is a probability and must have values between 0 and
1. We note that the inequality (7) is not the only law of
large numbers that can be used to find these bounds.
Tighter (asymmetric) bounds can be achieved by apply-
ing both the Chernoff bound and the Hoeffding’s inequal-
ity [14, 15]. Recently, even tighter bounds were obtained
with clever usage of the Chernoff bound alone [16].
The definition of Γi and γi above may be too fine-
grained for a QKD protocol such that each individual
εiPE may be too small for a given value of εPE. The secu-
rity of a QKD protocol typically can be defined with only
a few parameters; for example, the security of BB84 re-
lies on only the bit error rates when both parties choose
the Z-basis and the X-basis. Coarse-graining the con-
straints can be achieved by merging the constraints Γi
together, e.g. by summing a subset of or by taking an
average value of the constraints and the observed statis-
tics. Coarse-graining, from an optimization perspective,
loosens a constraint such that the guaranteed key rate
can be lower than the optimal value of the calculations
with fine-grained constraints. However, coarse-graining
can provide tighter bounds on γi’s for the same value of
εPE that can result in a higher secret key rate.
We now use two methods to evaluate a reliable numer-
ical lower bound on the quantity Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
ZAE
|ρ⊗nE ) that
will allow us to eventually quantify the key length ℓ—
hence the key rate r.
Key rate estimation using von Neumann entropy
The smooth min-entropy of an independent and iden-
tically distributed product state ρ⊗nZAE converges to the
von Neumann entropy in the limit of large n:
lim
n→∞
[
1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
ZAE
|ρ⊗nE )
]
= H(ρZAE |ρE) = H(ZA|E).
(9)
For the case of finite number of signals n, these two en-
tropic quantities are related via a correction factor ob-
tained in Corrollary 3.3.7 of Ref. [10], i.e.
1
n
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
ZAE
|ρ⊗nE ) ≥ H(ZA|E)− δ(n, ε), (10)
where, δ(n, ǫ) = (2d + 3)
√
log2(2/ε)/n is the correction
factor. It is worth pointing out that the right hand side of
Eq. (10) is an achievable secure lower bound to estimate
4the key rate. We apply this result to obtain an εqkd-
secure finite-key QKD protocol that is εcor-correct and
εsec-secret (with εcor + εsec ≤ εqkd) at a secret key rate
per transmission of:
r1 =
ℓ
N
=
n
N
⌊
H(ZA|E)− δ(n, ε)− 1
n
leakEC
− 2
n
log2
1
2εPA
− 1
n
log2
2
εcor
⌋
,
(11)
which is in terms of the von Neumann entropy instead of
the smooth min-entropy. The protocol is secret up to a
failure probability of εsec ≥ ε+ εPA + εPE + εEC.
In light of Eq. (11), the optimization problem that we
have to solve is minρAB∈CεPE H(ZA|E). Ref. [5] shows
how to recast this as an optimization problem with the
quantum relative entropy, rather than the von Neumann
entropy, as the objective function. Ref. [6] further devel-
oped a two-step method to obtain a secure lower bound.
Simply put, this two-step method consists of finding an
approximate minimum (step one), and then solving a lin-
earized version of the SDP around this approximate min-
imum to obtain a secure lower bound (step two). In this
work we use the semidefinite approximation of the matrix
logarithm and quantum relative entropy from Ref. [17]
to peform step one, and then follow step two directly
as described in Ref. [6]. The Methods section contains
a review of the SDP developed in Ref. [6], and a more
detailed description of our approach to step one.
Key rate estimation using min-entropy
To compute the key rate via the min-entropy, we use
the fact that the smooth min-entropy is a maximization
of the min-entropy and is equal to the min-entropy when
the smoothing parameter ε = 0, i.e.
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
ZAE
|ρ⊗nE ) ε→0−−−→ Hmin(ρ⊗nZAE |ρ⊗nE ). (12)
Then, using the additivity of min-entropy (derived in
Lemma 3.1.6 of Ref. [10]) we have that:
Hεmin(ρ
⊗n
ZAE
|ρ⊗nE )
ε→0−−−→ Hmin(ρ⊗nZAE |ρ⊗nE )
= nHmin(ρZAE |ρE)
= nHmin(ZA|E),
(13)
which gives a lower bound on the smooth min-entropy in
terms of the single-transmission min-entropy. (The same
result using different bounds of the smooth min-entropy
is found in Ref. [18].)
This approach guarantees an εqkd-secure QKD proto-
col that is εcor-correct and εsec-secret at a secret key rate
per transmission of:
r2 =
ℓ
N
=
n
N
⌊
Hmin(ZA|E)− 1
n
leakEC
− 2
n
log2
1
2εPA
− 1
n
log2
2
εcor
⌋
.
(14)
The secrecy of the protocol is found by composing the
error terms εsec ≥ εPA + εPE + εEC (since ε = 0).
The optimization problem to be solved in this formu-
lation is therefore minρAB∈CεPE [Hmin(ZA|E)]. To solve
this problem, we must show how the objective function
Hmin(ZA|E) can be expressed in terms of an optimization
problem that does not include Eve’s state. We obtain
the following relation by following a similar approach to
Ref. [19] (further detailed in Methods):
Hmin(ZA|E) = − log2max
σAB
F (ρAB,
∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A),
(15)
where
F (ρ, σ) =
(
Tr
√√
ρσ
√
ρ
)2
(16)
is the fidelity function and σAB is a valid density matrix.
Finally, using the linear SDP developed in Ref. [20] for
the fidelity, we obtain a SDP that can be solved for a
secure lower bound to the min-entropy, and therefore for
the finite key rate (see Methods for further details).
The lower bound to the key rate using the single-
transmission min-entropy is typically not as tight as that
using the von Neumann entropy. However, this formula-
tion is computationally less expensive than the von Neu-
mann approach, and is therefore useful for protocols with
signal states that have a large Hilbert space.
Examples
We now illustrate our numerical approach for obtain-
ing reliable lower bounds on the QKD secret key rate
by applying it to some well-known protocols. We con-
sider the BB84 protocol [2], the B92 protocol [21], and
the novel Twin-Field QKD protocol [22] (that is able to
beat the fundamental capacity for direct quantum com-
munication without any repeater [23]). We use BB84 as
a benchmark, showing that our numerics exactly repro-
duce the known theoretical results based on analytical
solutions to the key rate problem. For B92 and Twin-
Field QKD, where analytical solutions are not known in
general, we present novel results in the finite key regime
using the approaches derived in the previous section.
We supplement the finite key results for B92 and Twin-
Field QKD with asymptotic results using the numerical
approach of Ref. [6], and find improved secret key rate
lower bounds over those previously known. In the Sup-
plementary Note D, we study protocols that lack symme-
try, which have previously been analyzed numerically in
the asymptotic regime [6]. In particular, we look at vari-
ations of BB84: one with detector-efficiency mismatch,
and one with Trojan-horse attacks. For all results pre-
sented we used the Mosek [7] SDP solver, with the SDPs
programmed within a disciplined convex programming
framework: cvxpy [24, 25] in Python or CVX [26, 27] in
MATLAB.
5BB84
Let us start by considering the idealized entanglement-
based version of the BB84 protocol [2]. Alice and Bob
each receive a qubit from a maximally entangled state
|Φ+〉 = (|00〉 + |11〉)/√2 and measure their qubit with
probability pZ in the Z-basis = {|0〉, |1〉} or with prob-
ability pX = 1 − pZ in the X-basis = {|+〉, |−〉}. The
X-basis states are defined as |±〉 = (|0〉 ± |1〉)/√2.
Alice and Bob postselect for the cases when they both
measure their qubits in the same basis, discarding the
outcomes when they measure in different bases (see Sup-
plementary Note B for the postselection framework).
They then generate a secret key using the results when
they both measured in either the Z-basis or X-basis.
The maximally entangled state |Φ+〉 is generated in
Alice’s laboratory so that only one part of the state is
transmitted through the channel to Bob. To model this
transmission through the quantum channel, we consider
the depolarizing channel with a depolarizing probability
p on Bob’s qubit [28]:
Edep(ρ) = (1 − p)ρ+ p I
2
. (17)
Therefore, for this protocol, we consider the statistics
given by the state:
ρ′AB = (IA⊗EdepB (p))
(|Φ+〉〈Φ+|AB) . (18)
Typically in QKD experiments the key rates are deter-
mined by the quantum bit error rates (QBERs). There-
fore, we use these error rates to define coarse-grained
constraints for the key rate SDPs. The error operators
corresponding to the QBERs in the Z and X bases are:
EZ = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B,
EX = |+〉〈+|A ⊗ |−〉〈−|B + |−〉〈−|A ⊗ |+〉〈+|B,
(19)
whose expectation values (i.e. the QBERs) are QZ =
〈EZ〉 = Tr(ρ′ABEZ) and QX = 〈EX〉 = Tr(ρ′ABEX). For
the state defined in (18), one can show analytically that
QZ = QX = Q = 2p.
The analytical solution for the von Neumann entropy
optimization is
min
ρAB∈CεPE
ppassH(ZA|E) = (p2Z + p2X)
[
1− h2(QUB)
]
,
(20)
where h2(x) ≡ −x log2(x) − (1 − x) log2(1 − x) is the
binary entropy function. The factor (p2Z + p
2
X) is the
probability Alice and Bob postselect for the same basis.
Similarly, the solution for the min-entropy optimization
is [18]:
min
ρAB∈CεPE
ppassHmin(ZA|E)
= −(p2Z + p2X)
[
1− log2
(
1 + 2
√
QUB(1−QUB)
)]
,
(21)
where QUB = Q + ∆(εPE/2,mi) with ∆ > 0 being the
deviation that can be quantified using the law of large
numbers Eq. (7). We can compare the key rate predicted
by the SDP with these analytical formulas (in the asymp-
totic regime) and apply the same estimation methods to
both the numerical and the analytical key rates to com-
pare them in the non-asymptotic regime.
To simulate a realistic QKD system, we assume that
Alice and Bob uses αPE = 10% of the signals (after posts-
election) for parameter estimation. We take the protocol
to be correct up to εcor = 10
−15 and to be secret up to
εsec = 10
−10. For simplicity, we assume equal security
parameters of ε′ for εPA, εEC, and ε. For parameter es-
timation, we assume each constraint is estimated with a
failure probability up to εiPE = 2ε
′. The values of the
security parameters are tabulated in Tab. I. Therefore,
we have ε′ = εsec/7 for the calculation with von Neu-
mann entropy (Eq. (11) with SDPs (35) and (36)) and
ε′ = εsec/6 for the calculation with min-entropy (Eq. (14)
with SDP (45)).
von Neumann entropy
min-entropy
FIG. 1: Nonasymptotic secret key rate per pulse for the BB84
protocol calculated using the von Neumann entropy (top) and
the min-entropy (bottom) for different values of QBER. The
line is a known theoretical curve calculated from Eqs. (20)
and (21), and the dots are reliable lower bounds on the key
rate calculated numerically.
6Fig. 1 show the secret key rate per transmitted pulse
as a function of the number of transmissions, N , for both
numerical methods. We observe that for a QBER of 0%,
the bound from solving the min-entropy SDP is tighter
and rises to a significant value at a lower number of trans-
mitted signals. At higher error rates, solving the von
Neumann entropy SDP provides a better bound. In fact,
for a QBER & 7.58%, the bound from min-entropy pre-
dicts a zero key rate at any number of transmissions.
Parameter von Neumann entropy min-entropy
εEC ε
′ ε′
εPA ε
′ ε′
ε ε′ 0
αPE 10% 10%
εiPE 2ε
′ 2ε′
εPE 2nPEε
′ 2nPEε
′
εsec 10
−10 10−10
εcor 10
−15 10−15
TABLE I: Values of security parameters and other relevant
quantities for parameter estimation, assuming equal security
parameters of ε′ for the two numerical bounds: one bound is
calculated using von Neumann entropy and another bound us-
ing min-entropy. The parameters listed here are: εEC: error-
correction failure probability; εPA: privacy-amplification fail-
ure probability; ε: smoothing parameter for smooth min-
entropy; αPE: fraction of signals used for parameter esti-
mation; εiPE: failure probability of estimating parameter de-
scribed by constraint Γi; εPE: parameter-estimation total fail-
ure probability; nPE: number of constraints to be quantified
from the parameter estimation step; εsec: secrecy failure prob-
ability; εcor: probability that Alice and Bob’s secret keys are
not identical.
B92
The B92 protocol [21] is a simple QKD protocol that is
highly asymmetric. In this protocol, Alice prepares one of
two non-orthogonal states {|φ0〉, |φ1〉}, where 〈φ0|φ1〉 =
cos(θ/2)—each with a probability 1/2, which she will
send to Bob. Alice therefore prepares the state:
|ψ〉AB =
√
1
2
|0〉A|φ0〉B +
√
1
2
|1〉A|φ1〉B. (22)
Upon receiving the signals from Alice, Bob randomly
measures either in the B0 = {|φ0〉, |φ¯0〉} or in the B1 =
{|φ1〉, |φ¯1〉} basis, where 〈φ0|φ¯0〉 = 〈φ1|φ¯1〉 = 0. Bob
postselects for those instances where he measures |φ¯0〉 or
|φ¯1〉, and publicly announces ‘pass’. He then assigns a
bit value 1 or 0, respectively, to his key. If he measures
|φ0〉 or |φ1〉, he will announce ‘failure’, and both parties
discard these signals.
As constraints for the problem we use operators that
describe (on the postselected state) both a successful out-
come, where Bob’s measurement bit makes Alice’s pre-
pared bit, and an unsuccessful one, where they do not
agree:
Γ(=) = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |φ¯1〉〈φ¯1|B + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |φ¯0〉〈φ¯0|B ,
Γ( 6=) = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |φ¯0〉〈φ¯0|B + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |φ¯1〉〈φ¯1|B .
(23)
In addition, since this is a prepare-and-measure protocol,
we must add the constraints related to Alice’s knowledge
of ρA, i.e. we add the constraints Ω
j
A⊗ IB = |ψj〉〈ψj |A⊗
IB obtained from the spectral decomposition of ρA =∑
j pj |ψj〉〈ψj |A.
To simulate the channel, we again consider that the
signal undergoes a depolarizing channel with probabil-
ity p as it travels from Alice to Bob. Figure 2 shows
the results of our numerical method in the asymptotic
limit. We plot the secret key rate per pulse against the
angle θ and against the depolarizing probability p af-
ter optimizing for the parameter θ. The asymptotic for-
mula is obtained by taking the von Neumann formulation
with N → ∞ (and n → ∞), and replacing the con-
straints γLBk ≤ Tr(ρABΓk) ≤ γLBk with tight constraints
γk = Tr(ρABΓk). This is a direct application of the for-
malism developed in Ref. [6], and is not a development
of this manuscript, though the results we show have not
been reported elsewhere, and are a useful demonstration
of the power of numerical QKD calculations.
Our results guarantee a non-zero key rate even up to
p = 0.15 (with r1 = 0.00574 at θ = 64.8
◦), while pre-
vious analytical results predict a non-zero key rate only
for p ≤ 0.065 [10, 29, 30]. Furthermore, this numeri-
cal approach guarantees a higher-secret key rate when
compared to a previous numerical QKD approach de-
scribed in Ref. [5], which predicts a non-zero key rate for
p ≤ 0.053. For noise levels where all methods guaran-
tee finite key rates, our results show tighter secure lower
bounds than previous approaches. For example, for a
depolarizing noise of p = 0.01, the method of Ref. [6]
predicts r1 = 0.248, while the previous method of [5]
only obtains r1 ≈ 0.21 per pulse.
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FIG. 2: Secret key rate per pulse for the B92 protocol for
different depolarizing probability p in the asymptotic regime.
The rate is plotted against the Bloch-sphere angle between
the two signal states |φ0〉 and |φ1〉.
7Now, we consider the security of the B92 protocol in
the nonasymptotic regime, using the finite key SDPs de-
veloped in the previous section. Fig. 3 shows the secret
key generation rate per pulse in terms of the number
of signals that Alice has sent, for different values of p.
For each curve, we choose the value of θ that maximizes
the secret key rate. We consider the security parame-
ters tabulated in Tab. I and assume that the protocol
is εsec = 10
−10-secret and εcor = 10
−15-correct. Our
analysis shows that the B92 protocol is a simple way of
exchanging random secret keys with composable security.
von Neumann entropy
min-entropy
FIG. 3: Secret key rate per pulse for the B92 protocol cal-
culated using the von Neumann entropy (top) and the min-
entropy (bottom) for different values of depolarizing proba-
bility p.
Twin-Field QKD
Twin-Field QKD is a novel variation of the
measurement-device-independent (MDI)-QKD protocol
that enables two parties to communicate through an in-
termediate untrusted node [31]. The main difference is
that TF-QKD uses single-photon interference (instead of
two-photon interference in MDI-QKD), and achieves a
key rate that is expected to beat the fundamental in-
formation capacity for the repeaterless quantum commu-
nication rate, typically at long distances [22]. Because
the protocol promises higher secret key rates than pre-
vious QKD protocols at long distances, it is a subject
of extensive research both theoretically and experimen-
tally. Theoretically, several security proofs of the proto-
col (and its variations) with asymptotic [32–34] and non-
asymptotic [35–37] key rates have been proposed. Ex-
perimentally, the protocol has been demonstrated within
the laboratory setting [38–41], and future field tests of
the protocol are to be expected.
In the entanglement-based description of Twin-Field
QKD presented in Ref. [33], Alice and Bob each prepare
the entangled state |Φq〉 = √q|00〉 +
√
1− q|11〉 for 0 ≤
q ≤ 1, where |0〉 is the vacuum state (as opposed to the
logical state 0) and |1〉 is the single photon state [42].
They then randomly choose to measure their qubits in
the standard Z = {|0〉, |1〉} basis with probability pZ or
in the X = {|+〉, |−〉} basis with probability pX = 1−pZ .
Alice and Bob send one part of their quantum sig-
nals (A′ for Alice and B′ for Bob) through optical chan-
nels with transmittance
√
η to Charlie. The total optical
transmittance from Alice to Bob is η. Charlie then per-
forms a Bell-state measurement on the combined state
A′B′ that he has received. One way to do so is to use a
50:50 beamsplitter to mix Alice and Bob’s signals, and
then route the outputs of this beamsplitter to two single-
photon detectors. Charlie announces which of his two
detectors fires, and Alice and Bob postselect for those
events where one (and only one) detector fires. This is
equivalent to postselecting for Charlie’s state being one of
the Bell states |Ψ±〉. We can postselect to |Ψ+〉 and |Ψ−〉
independently, and we focus our discussion henceforth on
postselection to the single state |Ψ−〉 and the same argu-
ments apply for postselection to the state |Ψ+〉.
The measurement POVMs for analyzing the Twin-
Field QKD protocol are
Alice’s POVM Basis Bit-value
pZ |0〉〈0|A Z 0
pZ |1〉〈1|A Z 1
pX |+〉〈+|A X 0
pX |−〉〈−|A X 1
for Alice, and
Bob’s POVM Basis Bit-value
pZ |0〉〈0|B Z 0
pZ |1〉〈1|B Z 1
pX |+〉〈+|B X 0
pX |−〉〈−|B X 1
for Bob. In the simulation, the channel that the transmit-
ted signal goes through is a pure-loss channel (or an am-
plitude damping channel for the single photon case [28]).
We can describe the pure-loss channel E loss(√η) using
a beam-splitter transformation with the help of an addi-
tional Hilbert space A0 starting in the vacuum state. For
example, the photon creation operator for Alice’s trans-
mitted signal aˆ†A′ undergoes the following transformation
8for a channel with transmittance
√
η:(
aˆ†A′
aˆ†A0
)
→
( √
η1/2
√
1− η1/2
−
√
1− η1/2
√
η1/2
)(
aˆ†A′
aˆ†A0
)
. (24)
Here, aˆ†A0 is the creation operator for the additional
Hilbert space. In summary, to describe the transmitted
state, Alice generates the entangled state:
|ψ〉AA′A0 = |Φq〉AA′ ⊗ |0〉A0 , (25)
which then undergoes a pure loss channel before being
measured by Charlie. The state after the transmission is
ρ′AA′ = TrA0
[
(IA⊗E lossA′A0(
√
η))
(|ψ〉〈ψ|AA′A0)] . (26)
We can also define a similar state for Bob:
ρ′BB′ = TrB0
[
(IB ⊗E lossB′B0(
√
η))
(|ψ〉〈ψ|BB′B0)] , (27)
and the overall state after both Alice and Bob’s trans-
missions is: ρ′AA′BB′ = ρ
′
AA′ ⊗ ρ′BB′ .
Charlie, equipped with only threshold detectors, can-
not distinguish between the click due to a only single
photon arriving at his first detector and the click due
to two photons arriving. Therefore, he is projecting the
signals he receives to
|Ψ˜−〉〈Ψ˜−|A′B′ =
1
2
(|Ψ−〉〈Ψ−|A′B′ + |11〉〈11|A′B′) .
(28)
We further assume that Charlie’s detectors have small,
but non-negligible dark counts. Let pd be the dark count
probability for each clock cycle. We can modify Charlie’s
projection operator above into the following POVM:
|Ψ˜−dark〉〈Ψ˜−dark|A′B′ = (1− pd)2|Ψ˜−〉〈Ψ˜−|A′B′
+ pd(1− pd) IA
′B′
4
.
(29)
Alice and Bob postselect those cases, where Alice and
Bob measure in the same basis and Charlie successfully
measures |Ψ˜−dark〉〈Ψ˜−dark|.
The performance of the protocol in the asymptotic
limit as a function of the overall loss between Alice and
Bob is plotted in Fig. 4. At each loss value, we optimize
for the value of q that gives the best key rate using the
Brent’s method [43, 44]. As shown in Fig. 5, the value of
q increases monotonically to about ∼ 0.93 at 40 dB loss,
and saturates at this value for higher losses. The high
value of q suggests that a weakly pumped photon pair
source, which uses spontaneous parametric down conver-
sion or spontaneous four-wave mixing, would be ideal to
generate the initial entangled states.
From Fig. 4, it is clear that the Twin-Field QKD
protocol—at sufficiently high losses (above ∼ 40 dB)—
can perform better than the capacity of direct repeater-
less quantum communications, which we dub as the
PLOB bound after the original authors [23]. For a chan-
nel with a transmittance η, the bound which is an achiev-
able rate is − log2(1−η) and scales linearly as ∼ η at low
transmittance. As the dark count rate increases, the re-
gion of losses at which the Twin-Field QKD protocol can
beat the PLOB bound is reduced.
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FIG. 4: Secret key rate per pulse for the Twin-Field QKD pro-
tocol as a function of the overall loss between Alice and Bob.
The different lines are for QKD operations with different dark
count probability pd. The black dashed line corresponds to
PLOB bound: the fundamental bound for direct repeaterless
communications, calculated with η = 10−(Loss in dB)/10.
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FIG. 5: Optimized value of q that gives the highest secret key
rate at each loss value.
For the nonasymptotic regime, we evaluate the secu-
rity of a protocol that is εsec-secret and εcor-correct with
εsec = 10
−10 and εcor = 10
−15. We consider the values
for the security parameters as in Tab. I.
Fig. 6 shows that the nonasymptotic bounds from
von Neumann entropy can obtain better secret key rates
than the PLOB bounds—even with the presence of dark
counts. The plots also show that to faithfully demon-
strate a better rate than the PLOB bound in a Twin-
Field QKD experiment, both Alice and Bob must send a
large number of transmissions to Charlie. For example,
at 60 dB overall channel loss, they must send N ∼ 1010
transmissions which are ∼ 105 higher than the number of
9transmissions needed to obtain a substantial secret key
in a BB84 QKD protocol (see Fig. 1). Interestingly, the
bounds from min-entropy are unable to beat the PLOB
bound, but they do guarantee a substantial secret key
rate even at orders of magnitude fewer transmissions.
von Neumann entropy
min-entropy
FIG. 6: Secret key rate per pulse for the Twin-Field QKD
protocol calculated at different values of dark count pd and
overall channel loss. The key rates are obtained from von
Neumann entropy (top) and from min-entropy (bottom). The
dashed lines with the same color are the PLOB bound at the
different loss values, i.e. blue: 60 dB loss, orange: 80 dB loss,
green: 100 dB loss.
DISCUSSION
We have developed semidefinite programs for finding
reliable lower bounds on the secret key rate of an arbi-
trary QKD protocol in the nonasymptotic regime. We
presented two methods of calculating such bounds, one
via an SDP for von Neumann entropy and one via an
SDP for min-entropy. For some of the protocols we
have considered, the bound from min-entropy provides
a better key rate than the bound for von Neumann
entropy at lower error rates and at lower numbers of
transmissions. The computational advantage for solving
the SDP for min-entropy is also clear since the problem
is more tractable than that for von Neumann entropy.
For a problem involving a density matrix between Alice
and Bob of size n × n, the SDP (45) for min-entropy
only requires us to solve for O(n2) parameters while the
SDP (35) for von Neumann entropy requires us to solve
for O(n4) parameters. Nevertheless, the nonasymptotic
bound from von Neumann entropy guarantees a better
secret key rate at higher numbers of transmission and,
unlike the bound from min-entropy, can approach the
asymptotic key rate. The supremum between these two
methods should be considered as the tightest lower bound
that our numerical approach offers.
So far, we have only considered security against collec-
tive attacks. Some protocols with high-symmetry have
been found to have the same secret key rates under col-
lective attacks and under the more general coherent at-
tacks. Examples of these protocols include popular pro-
tocols such as BB84.
General methods for bounding the possible informa-
tion advantage of coherent attacks over collective attacks
has been outlined in multiple approaches. The first such
approach uses the exponential de Finetti theorem [45],
but the overhead obtained by this theorem turns out
to be heavy making the finite-key bounds unrealistically
pessimistic. The de Finetti theorem is tight if one com-
pares the attacks signal-by-signal. Ref. [46] found that
it suffices to only consider the entire collection of states.
This method, known as the postselection technique, com-
pares the distance between two maps: the map between
the ideal protocol and an actual protocol under collective
attacks and the map between the ideal protocol and an
actual protocol under coherent attacks.
Using the postselection technique, we can define a new
secrecy parameter under a coherent attack εcohsec , which
quantifies the probability the QKD protocol passes but
is not secret to an eavesdropper with coherent-attack ca-
pabilities. εcohsec is related to the secrecy parameter under
collective attack εsec in the following manner:
εsec = ε
coh
sec (N + 1)
−(d4−1). (30)
For the above value of secrecy, the key rate under coher-
ent attack rcoh is related to the key rate under collective
attack r by the following relation:
rcoh = r − 2(d4 − 1) log2(N + 1)
N
. (31)
Our numerical method is reliable and robust for cal-
culating key rates involving single photon transmissions.
Most practical implementations of QKD however have
relied on the use of weak coherent states made by highly
attenuated laser pulses. We hope to eventually evalu-
ate such protocols numerically in the future. However,
two main issues must be addressed when doing so. First,
the probability of multiphoton emissions from a highly
attenuated coherent light source, although small, is not
negligible. Multiphoton signals are inherently insecure
due to a class of attacks called the photon number split-
ting attack. One solution to combat the photon number
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splitting attack is to implement the decoy state protocol.
In the decoy state protocol, Alice prepares an additional
set of states—the decoy states—that are used to detect
the presence of eavesdropping [47, 48]. Therefore, we
plan to incorporate decoy state analysis to the numerical
method in the future.
Second, Alice’s coherent state transmission uses an
infinite-dimensional Hilbert space. The calculation on
this infinite-dimensional space is extremely challenging.
For simple QKD protocols, there exist squashing maps
that provide direct correlations between measurements in
the infinite-dimensional optical implementation and mea-
surements in the abstract low-dimensional protocol [49–
51]. Therefore, the numerical method (or the user) must
also be able to determine the appropriate squashing map
to reduce the size of the problem.
To conclude, our results extend the earlier numerical
QKD approaches by presenting a general robust frame-
work for calculating QKD key rates in nonasymptotic
regimes. The numerical methods presented here will be
useful for democratizing the QKD security proofs that
are needed to estimate the amount of secret key gener-
ated in any QKD operation.
Note added—We recently became aware of another
proposal for calculating the finite-key rate of a QKD pro-
tocol numerically [52].
METHODS
Proof of the relationship between min-entropy and
the fidelity function
We include the proof from Ref. [19] here for complete-
ness. In this proof, we consider the pure state shared
between Alice, Bob, and Eve: ρABE , and will use the
max-entropy, defined as:
Hmax(X |Y )ρ ≡ max
σY
log2 F (ρXY , IX ⊗σY ). (32)
The max-entropy is dual to the min-entropy, i.e.
Hmin(X |Y ) = −Hmax(X |Z) for any pure state ρXY Z .
Now, consider the pure state ρ˜ZAABE = VZAρABEV
†
ZA
with the isometry VZA =
∑
j |j〉ZA ⊗ Z
j
A representing
Alice’s key map. We can derive the following series of
equalities:
Hmin(ZA|E)ρ ≡ Hmin(ZA|E)ρ˜ = −Hmax(ZA|AB)
= − log2maxσAB F (ρ˜ZAAB, IZA ⊗σAB)
= − log2maxσAB F (ρ˜ZAAB, VZAV
†
ZA
(IZA ⊗σAB)VZAV †ZA)
= − log2maxσAB F (ρAB, V
†
ZA
(IZA ⊗σAB)VZA)
= − log2max
σAB
F (ρAB,
∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A), (33)
which relates the min-entropy to a maximization of the
fidelity. The third line is true because an isometry must
satisfy VZAV
†
ZA
= I, and the fourth line uses the fact that
fidelity is invariant under isometries.
SDP for quantum relative entropy
Let us express the problem in terms of a convex opti-
mization problem with quantum relative entropy as the
objective function:
minimize D
ρAB
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
ZjAρABZ
j
A

subject to Tr(ρABΓi) ≤ γUBi and Tr(ρABΓi) ≥ γLBi
for i = 1, . . . , nPE,
Tr(ρAB) = 1,
ρAB  0.
(34)
Here ZjA are projectors onto the signal-state basis of the
Hilbert space of A.
The SDP for the (m, k)-approximation of the quantum
relative entropy in this case is [17]:
minimize τ
subject to
(
Mi Mi+1
Mi+1 X
)
 0 for i = 0, . . . , k − 1,(〈e|X |e〉 − sjtj/wj 〈e|X
X |e〉 X + sj(Z −X)
)
 0
for j = 1, . . . ,m,∑
j
tj2
k + τ ≥ 0,
Y =M0, Z =Mk,
X = ρAB ⊗ I, Y = I⊗
∑
j
ZjAρABZ
j
A,
Tr(ρABΓk) ≤ γUBk and Tr(ρABΓk) ≥ γLBk
for k = 1, . . . , nPE,
Tr(ρAB) = 1,
ρAB  0,
(35)
where wj and sj are the weights and nodes for the
m-point Gauss-Legendre quadrature on interval [0, 1].
Here, |e〉 is the vector obtained by vertically stacking
the columns of an identity matrix.
Solving the approximate problem above only gives us
a density matrix ρˆAB that is close to the optimal ma-
trix ρ∗AB. However, as it pointed out by Ref. [6], we can
use this close-to-optimal density matrix ρˆAB and find a
secure lower bound through linearization of the convex
objective function: f(ρ) ≡ D(ρ ‖ ZjAρZjA). Using the
fact that this objective function is convex and differen-
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tiable, we have:
f(ρ∗AB) ≥ f(ρˆAB) + Tr
(∇f(ρˆAB)T (ρ∗AB − ρˆAB))
≥ f(ρˆAB) + min
σ∈C
Tr
(∇f(ρˆAB)T (σ − ρˆAB))
= f(ρˆAB)− Tr
(∇f(ρˆAB)T ρˆAB)
+ min
σ∈CεPE
Tr
(∇f(ρˆAB)Tσ) ,
(36)
where
∇f(ρAB)T = log2 ρAB − log2
∑
j
ZjAρABZ
j
A
 . (37)
The primal and dual SDPs for the last term in Eq. (36)
are:
Primal problem.
minimize Tr(∇f(ρˆAB)Tσ)
subject to Tr(σΓi) ≤ γUBi and Tr(σΓi) ≥ γLBi
for i = 1, . . . , nPE,
Tr(σ) = 1,
σ  0,
(38)
and
Dual problem.
maximize z +
nPE∑
i=1
(
xiγ
LB
i − yiγUBi
)
subject to z I+
nPE∑
i=1
(xi − yi) Γi  ∇f(ρˆAB)T ,
xi ≥ 0, yi ≥ 0, for i = 1, . . . , nPE.
(39)
Key rate problems for some of the more well-known
QKD protocols, e.g. the BB84 protocol, can be solved
efficiently (within a second on a personal computer) with
Eq. (35) using a commercial or an open-source SDP
solver, e.g. Mosek [7] or SeDuMi [8]. Some larger prob-
lems, such as the prepare-and-measure protocol or the
measurement-device-independent QKD protocol, require
simplification that makes use of the block diagonal struc-
ture of the density operator ρAB to be efficiently solved,
see Supplementary Note C and Refs. [53, 54].
The main inefficiency in our formulation comes during
step one. Suppose that ρAB is an n × n matrix, then
X,Y, Z, and Mi matrices are of size n
2 × n2. Therefore,
the problem needs to solve a total of k blocks of 2n2 ×
2n2 positive semidefinite matrices along with another m
blocks of (n2+1)×(n2+1) positive semidefinite matrices.
It is therefore desirable to find another approximation
method that requires a smaller number of parameters.
SDP for min-entropy and quantum fidelity
Ref. [20] shows how the fidelity can be expressed in
terms of a simple linear SDP. The primal and dual SDP
problems for computing the
√
F (P,Q) between two op-
erators P  0 and Q  0 are as follows:
Primal problem.
minimize Tr(PY11) + Tr(QY22)
subject to
(
Y11 0
0 Y22
)
 1
2
(
0 I
I 0
)
.
Y11  0, Y22  0.
(40)
and
Dual problem.
maximize
1
2
(
TrX12 +TrX
†
12
)
subject to
(
X11 X12
X†12 X22
)
 0,
X11  P, X22  Q.
(41)
We can therefore formulate the following optimization
problem:
g(CεPE) ≡ min
ρAB∈CεPE
Hmin(ZA|E)
= min
ρAB∈CεPE
− log2maxσAB F (ρAB,∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A)

= − log2 max
ρAB∈CεPE
max
σAB
F (ρAB,
∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A)
= −2 log2 max
ρAB∈CεPE
max
σAB
√
F (ρAB ,
∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A).
(42)
In particular, we can compute the following quantity:
2−g(CεPE )/2 = max
ρAB∈CεPE
max
σAB
√
F (ρAB,
∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A).
(43)
The primal SDP problem for the quantity 2−g(CεPE )/2
is
Primal problem.
maximize
1
2
(
TrX12 +TrX
†
12
)
subject to X11  ρAB, X22 
∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A,
Tr(ρABΓi) ≤ γUBi and Tr(ρABΓi) ≥ γLBi
for i = 1, . . . , nPE,
Tr(ρAB) = 1, Tr(σAB) = 1,(
X11 X12
X†12 X22
)
 0,
ρAB  0, σAB  0,
(44)
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that can be transformed into the following dual problem: Dual problem.
minimize z + y¯ +
nPE∑
i=1
(
yiγ
UB
i − xiγLBi
)
subject to
nPE∑
i=1
(yi − xi)Γi + y¯ I  Y11,
z I 
∑
j
ZjAY22Z
j
A,(
Y11 0
0 Y22
)
 1
2
(
0 I
I 0
)
.
Y11  0, Y22  0, yi ≥ 0, xi ≥ 0.
(45)
Solving the dual problem (45) directly provides a reliable
lower bound to the key rate. The min-entropy SDP de-
rived here has a computational advantage over the von
Neumann SDP, due to the fact that other than the pos-
itive real numbers xi and yi, only two matrices Y11 and
Y22—both of the same size as the density matrix ρAB—
have to be computed.
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Supplementary Note A: Convex optimization
Problems in quantum information can often be for-
mulated as an optimization problem. In particular, the
secret key rate problem can be expressed as a convex op-
timization problem, specifically a semidefinite program.
There is in general no analytical formula for the solu-
tion of convex optimization problems, but there are effi-
cient methods for solving them, such as the interior point
methods [55].
A convex optimization problem is an optimization
problem of the form:
Primal problem.
minimize f0(x)
subject to fi(x) ≤ 0, i = 1, . . . ,m
aTi x = bi, i = 1, . . . , p,
(A1)
where f0, . . . , fm are convex functions, i.e. fi(px1 + (1−
p)x2) ≤ pfi(x1) + (1 − p)fi(x2) for any x1, x2 and 0 ≤
p ≤ 1. Let us call the set of x values that satisfies the
constraints as the feasible set, denoted as P . We refer to
this problem as the primal problem.
By rewriting the equality constraint as hi(x) = a
T
i x−bi
and require hi(x) = 0, we can define the Lagrangian
associated with Prob. (A1) as
L(x, λ, ν) = f0(x) +
m∑
i=1
λifi(x) +
p∑
i=1
νihi(x), (A2)
where λi and νi are Lagrange multipliers associated with
the problem.
For each primal problem, there exists an associated
dual problem:
Dual problem.
maximize g(λ, ν)
subject to ν ≥ 0, (A3)
where g(λ, ν) ≡ infx∈P L(x, ν, λ). The significance of this
dual problem is as follows. The optimal value of the
dual problem (Prob. (A3)) d∗ is, by definition, the best
lower bound on the optimal value of the primal problem
(Prob. (A1)) p∗. In particular, we have an important
relation d∗ ≤ p∗ called weak duality, which always holds
even when the problem is not convex.
If the gap between d∗ and p∗ is 0, then we say that
strong duality holds. For convex optimization problems,
the strong duality holds if Slater’s condition is satisfied:
if there exists a point x ∈ P such that all the inequal-
ity constraints fi(x) is strictly less than zero and all the
equality constraints are satisfied [55].
An important class of convex optimization problems
that are often encountered in quantum information pro-
cessing is the semidefinite program (SDP). Here we define
a semidefinite program in the standard form proposed
by [20] that is more directly applicable to working with
quantum density matrices.
Let us first define several mathematical terms to help
our discussion. Given a complex vector space X = Cn,
we call an n×n linear operator X Hermitian if X = X†;
let us denote the set of such operators with Herm(X ). An
operator X is called positive semidefinite if it is Hermi-
tian and all of its eigenvalues are nonnegative. We use the
notation X  0 to indicate that X is positive semidefi-
nite. More generally, Y  X indicates that Y −X  0 for
Hermitian operators X and Y . We also use the notation
X ≻ 0 to indicate that the operatorX is positive definite:
Hermitian and all its eigenvalues are strictly positive.
An SDP can be defined using a few parameters:
• Φ which is a Hermiticity-preserving linear map, and
• A and B which are Hermitian operators.
We define the primal of an SDP problem to be:
Primal problem.
minimize 〈A,X〉
subject to Φ(X)  B,
X  0,
(A4)
where the inner product 〈A,B〉 ≡ Tr(A†B). The La-
grange dual problem to the SDP above is
Dual problem.
maximize 〈B, Y 〉
subject to Φ†(Y )  A,
Y  0.
(A5)
The mapping Φ† is a unique mapping that can be defined
from the following equation:
〈Y,Φ(X)〉 = 〈Φ†(Y ), X〉 . (A6)
An operator X  0 satisfying Φ(X)  B is called pri-
mal feasible, and an operator Y  0 satisfying Φ†(Y )  A
is called dual feasible. We denote the sets of primal and
dual feasible operators with P and D, respectively.
Weak duality holds for any SDP, that is the optimal
value of the primal problem p∗ and the optimal value
of the dual problem d∗ are always related by p∗ ≥ d∗.
Strong duality holds if either of the following Slater’s
conditions are satisfied [56]:
1. If P is nonempty and there exists an operator Y ≻
0 such that Φ†(Y ) ≺ A, then there exists a primal
feasible operatorX for which 〈A,X〉 = p∗ and p∗ =
d∗,
2. If D is nonempty and there exists an operator X ≻
0 such that Φ(X) ≻ B, then there exists a dual
feasible operator Y for which 〈B, Y 〉 = d∗ and p∗ =
d∗.
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Supplementary Note B: General framework for
postselection
Typically in a QKD protocol, Alice and Bob make pub-
lic announcements during sifting in which they postselect
for certain basis choices. During the quantum trans-
mission stage, Alice and Bob measure their respective
POVMs {M (ab,av)A } and {M (bb,bv)B } [57]. We follow the
approach previously established in several papers (see
e.g. [6]) and introduce extra classical registers Ab and Av
for Alice and Bb and Bv for Bob to store the basis and
value information respectively. The idea is that Alice and
Bob will keep most of the registers Av and Bv to them-
selves (releasing some information for error correction),
while they will eventually make public the registers Ab
and Bb. Alice’s measurements and announcements can
be described by a quantum channel with Kraus operators
KabA =
∑
av
√
M
(ab,av)
A ⊗ |ab〉Ab |av〉Av , (B1)
and, similarly, Bob’s can be described by another set of
Kraus operators
KbbB =
∑
bv
√
M
(bb,bv)
B ⊗ |bb〉Bb |bv〉Bv . (B2)
The quantum state after the announcement can be ob-
tained through a completely positive trace-preserving
(CPTP) map A involving the Kraus operators above, i.e.
ρannAAvAbBBvBb = A(ρAB)
=
∑
ab,bb
(KabA ⊗KbbB )ρAB(KabA ⊗KbbB )†.
(B3)
Next, Alice and Bob will postselect/sift to decide which
parts of the data they will keep. Let Bkeep be the set of
basis measurements they will keep. For example, they
may choose to keep only measurements in the same basis.
Then, we can define a projector:
Π =
∑
(ab,bb)∈Bkeep
|ab〉〈ab|Ab ⊗ |bb〉〈bb|Bb . (B4)
The postselected state can then be modeled by using this
projector:
ρsiftAAvAbBBvBb =
ΠρannAAvAbBBvBbΠ
ppass
, (B5)
with ppass = Tr(Πρ
ann
AAvAbBBvBb
) is the probability of
passing the postselection filter [58]. We therefore can
define a completely positive trace non-increasing map S
for sifting, such that:
S(ρAB) = ΠA(ρAB)Π = ppass ρsiftAAvAbBBvBb . (B6)
Following the derivation in [19], we define another
isometry VZA =
∑
j |j〉ZA ⊗ Z
j
Av
to store the raw key
information in the register ZA. Applying this isometry
to ρsift gives us:
ρ˜siftZAAAvAbBBvBb = VZAρ
sift
AAvAbBBvBb
V †ZA . (B7)
We then take Eve’s system to purify the state ρsift (and
ρ˜sift) such that she’s able to obtain the maximum amount
of information from not only A and B, but also Av, Ab,
Bv, and Bb. The key-rate problems that are solved by
using von Neumann entropy are therefore modified from
minρAB H(ZA|E)ρ to minρAB
[
ppassH(ZA|E)ρ˜sift
]
. Using
similar arguments as outlined in the main manuscript,
we obtain:
H(ZA|E)ρ˜sift = H(ρ˜siftZAE)−H(ρsiftE )
= H(ρ˜siftAAvAbBBvBb)−H(ρsiftAAvAbBBvBb)
= D(ρsiftAAvAbBBvBb ‖ ρ˜siftAAvAbBBvBb)
=
1
ppass
D
S(ρAB)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
ZjAvS(ρAB)Z
j
Av
,
(B8)
where the last line has been derived using the property
that D(cρ ‖ cσ) = cD(ρ ‖ σ) for any constant c > 0. Fur-
thermore, when linearizing this key rate problem to ob-
tain a dual solution, we must update the gradient∇f(ρ)T
defined in Eq. (37) to:
∇f(ρAB)T = S† (log2 S(ρAB))
− S†
log2∑
j
ZjAvS(ρAB)Z
j
Av
 ,
(B9)
where S† is the adjoint map of S that can be found from
the fact that:
Tr[S(ρ)σ] = Tr[ρS†(σ)]. (B10)
Explicitly, since
S(ρ) =
∑
ab,bb
Π(KabA ⊗KbbB )ρ(KabA ⊗KbbB )†Π, (B11)
then the adjoint map is
S†(ρsift) =
∑
ab,bb
(KabA ⊗KbbB )†ΠρsiftΠ(KabA ⊗KbbB ). (B12)
Similarly, we modify the key-rate problems that are
solved using min-entropy from minρAB Hmin(ZA|E)ρ to
minρAB
[
ppassHmin(ZA|E)ρ˜sift
]
. Using similar arguments
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to the ones in the main manuscript, we obtain:
Hmin(ZA|E)ρ˜sift
= −Hmax(ZA|AAvAbBBvBb)
= − log2max
σAB
F
(
ρ˜siftZAAAvAbBBvBb , IZA ⊗ σAAvAbBBvBb
)
= − log2max
σAB
F
S(ρAB)/ppass,∑
j
ZjAvσAAvAbBBvBbZ
j
Av

= − log2max
σAB
F
S(ρAB),∑
j
ZjAvσAAvAbBBvBbZ
j
Av

+ log2 ppass,
(B13)
where the last line is found by noticing that F (cσ, ρ) =
F (σ, cρ) = cF (σ, ρ) for any constant c > 0.
When solving the numerical key rate problems, one can
use the fine-grained constraints Γi =M
(ab,av)
A ⊗M (bb,bv)B
for all values of {(ab, av), (bb, bv)}. However, with mea-
surement bases being well-defined in this framework, we
can find general coarse-grained constraints where Alice
and Bob obtain the same or different classical measure-
ment values within each basis they postselect for. In
other words, for (ab, bb) ∈ Bkeep, we can find such con-
straints:
Γ
(=)
(ab,bb)
=
∑
av=bv
M
(ab,av)
A ⊗M (bb,bv)B , (B14)
and
Γ
( 6=)
(ab,bb)
=
∑
av 6=bv
M
(ab,av)
A ⊗M (bb,bv)B . (B15)
Although generally using coarse-grained constraints leads
to lower key rates, the key rates obtained in the more
symmetric protocols we consider show no noticeable dif-
ference when compared to the key rates obtained using
fine-grained constraints. In fact, when using only the
coarse-grained constraints, the amount of information
that must be communicated classically between Alice and
Bob is reduced.
Notice that this framework for postselection generally
increases the size of the computation as it dilates the
Hilbert space needed from just AB to include extra reg-
isters AvAbBvBb. In particular, the SDP for solving the
approximate problem involving the quantum relative en-
tropy can become too large for a typical personal com-
puter to handle. We are, however, able to simplify the
postselection procedure for some protocols without need-
ing to introduce many extra registers.
Supplementary Note C: Simplification to the
postselection procedure
Whenever postselection is performed—even for the
simplest postselected BB84 protocol—direct calculation
of the approximate SDP for quantum relative entropy can
become a bottleneck (see SDP (35)). For a density ma-
trix ρ of size n×n, solving the approximate SDP problem
at order (m, k) involves solving for a total of k blocks of
2n2× 2n2 positive semidefinite matrices and m blocks of
(n2+1)× (n2+1) positive semidefinite matrices. For the
postselected BB84 protocol, n = (dimA) × (dimAv) ×
(dimAb)× (dimB)× (dimBv)× (dimBb) = 64 which re-
sults in an extremely large SDP to solve. We see a slow-
down in the SDP for the fidelity function (see SDP (45)),
but the problem is still small enough for our numerical
solvers to find a solution within a reasonable amount of
time.
We outline simplification steps that allows us to dra-
matically increase the calculation speed for the examples
that we explore in this manuscript.
1. BB84
The Kraus operators related to Alice and Bob’s an-
nouncements are:
K0A =
√
pZ
[|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉Ab ⊗ |0〉Av
+|1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉Ab ⊗ |1〉Av
]
K1A =
√
pX
[|+〉〈+|A ⊗ |1〉Ab ⊗ |0〉Av
+|−〉〈−|A ⊗ |1〉Ab ⊗ |1〉Av
]
K0B =
√
pZ
[|0〉〈0|B ⊗ |0〉Bb + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ |0〉Bb]
=
√
pZ IB ⊗|0〉Bb
K1B =
√
pX
[|+〉〈+|B ⊗ |1〉Bb + |−〉〈−|B ⊗ |1〉Bb]
=
√
pX IB ⊗|1〉Bb ,
(C1)
where there is no need to keep track of Bv because the
key map is only applied to Alice’s value register.
With the postselection operator:
Π = |0〉〈0|Ab ⊗ |0〉〈0|Bb + |1〉〈1|Ab ⊗ |1〉〈1|Bb , (C2)
we can fully define the action of the sifting map:
S(ρAB) = Π
 ∑
ab,bb∈{ 0,1 }
(KabA K
bb
B )ρAB(K
ab
A K
bb
B )
†
Π
=
(
K0AK
0
B
)
ρAB
(
K0AK
0
B
)†
+
(
K1AK
1
B
)
ρAB
(
K1AK
1
B
)†
= p2Z |0〉〈0|Ab ⊗ |0〉〈0|Bb ⊗ ρz
+ p2X |1〉〈1|Ab ⊗ |1〉〈1|Bb ⊗ ρx.
(C3)
Notice that the expression above is block diagonal so we
can write:
S(ρAB) = p2Zρz ⊕ p2Xρx. (C4)
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a. The key rate SDP
The goal here is to simplify the key rate problem (in
the von Neumann entropy formalism) by separating out
the two blocks and thereby proving that
D
(S(ρAB) ∥∥ ZZAv (S(ρAB))) = p2ZD(ρAB ‖ ZZA (ρAB))
+ p2XD(ρAB ‖ ZXA (ρAB)),
(C5)
where we have defined the notation ZBH which is the
pinching channel in the B-basis acting on Hilbert space
H. In particular:
ZZA (ρAB)) =
∑
j∈{0,1}
|j〉〈j|AρAB|j〉〈j|A, (C6)
and
ZXA (ρAB)) =
∑
j∈{+,−}
|j〉〈j|AρAB|j〉〈j|A. (C7)
First, we state the following useful lemma:
Lemma C.1. Given M = A ⊕ B and M ′ = A′ ⊕ B′,
where dimA = dimA′ and dimB = dimB′, we have
Tr[M log2M
′] = Tr[A log2A
′] + Tr[B log2B
′]. (C8)
Proof. The proof can be obtained by direct computation.
Since we have
M =
(
A 0
0 B
)
, M ′ =
(
A′ 0
0 B′
)
, (C9)
then the term
log2M
′ =
(
log2A
′ 0
0 log2B
′
)
(C10)
.
Therefore,
M log2M
′ =
(
A log2A
′ 0
0 B log2B
′
)
, (C11)
and taking the trace of this matrix completes the proof.
Applying Lemma C.1 to D
(S(ρAB) ∥∥ ZZAv (S(ρAB))),
with the identification M = S(ρAB) and M ′ =
ZZAv (S(ρAB)), gives us
D
(S(ρAB) ∥∥ ZZAv (S(ρAB))) = p2ZD(ρz ∥∥ ZZAv (ρz))
+ p2XD
(
ρx
∥∥ ZZAv (ρx)).
(C12)
To obtain the simplified Eq. (C5), we show the follow-
ing:
D
(
ρz
∥∥ ZZAv (ρz)) = D(ρAB ∥∥ ZZA (ρAB)),
D
(
ρx
∥∥ ZZAv (ρx)) = D(ρAB ∥∥ ZXA (ρAB)). (C13)
The identification is straightforward. Let us write down
ρz in the basis of Av and A:
ρz =
〈0|Av〈0|A 〈1|Av 〈1|A( )|0〉Av |0〉A 〈0|ρAB|0〉A 〈0|ρAB|1〉A|1〉Av |1〉A 〈1|ρAB|0〉A 〈1|ρAB|1〉A , (C14)
which is equivalent to ρAB in the Z-basis:
ρAB =
〈0|A 〈1|A( )|0〉A 〈0|ρAB|0〉A 〈0|ρAB|1〉A|1〉A 〈1|ρAB|0〉A 〈1|ρAB|1〉A . (C15)
Now, let us write ZZAv (ρz) in the basis of Av and A:
ZZAv (ρz) =
〈0|Av〈0|A 〈1|Av〈1|A( )|0〉Av |0〉A 〈0|ρAB|0〉A 0|1〉Av |1〉A 0 〈1|ρAB|1〉A , (C16)
which is equivalent to ZZA (ρAB) in the Z-basis:
ZZA (ρAB) =
〈0|A 〈1|A( )|0〉A 〈0|ρAB|0〉A 0|1〉A 0 〈1|ρAB|1〉A , (C17)
that shows D
(
ρz
∥∥ ZZAv (ρz)) = D(ρAB ∥∥ ZZA (ρAB)).
Similarly, ρx in the Z-basis of Av and the X-basis of
A is:
ρx =
〈0|Av 〈+|A 〈1|Av 〈−|A( )|0〉Av |+〉A 〈+|ρAB|+〉A 〈+|ρAB|−〉A|1〉Av |−〉A 〈−|ρAB|+〉A 〈−|ρAB|−〉A , (C18)
which is equivalent to ρAB in the X-basis:
ρAB =
〈+|A 〈−|A( )|+〉A 〈+|ρAB|+〉A 〈+|ρAB|−〉A|−〉A 〈−|ρAB|+〉A 〈−|ρAB|−〉A . (C19)
Furthermore, ZZAv(ρx) in the Z-basis of Av and the X-
basis of A is:
ZZAv (ρx) =
〈0|Av 〈+|A 〈1|Av 〈−|A( )|0〉Av |+〉A 〈+|ρAB|+〉A 0|1〉Av |−〉A 0 〈−|ρAB|−〉A ,
(C20)
which is equivalent to ZXA (ρAB) in the X-basis:
ZXA (ρAB) =
〈+|A 〈−|A( )|+〉A 〈+|ρAB|+〉A 0|−〉A 0 〈−|ρAB|−〉A , (C21)
that gives us D
(
ρx
∥∥ ZZAv (ρx)) = D(ρAB ∥∥ ZXA (ρAB)).
Solving the SDP problem:
min
ρAB
[
D
(S(ρAB) ∥∥ ZZAv(S(ρAB)))] (C22)
is therefore equivalent to solving:
min
ρAB
[
p2ZD
(
ρAB
∥∥ ZZA (ρAB))+ p2XD(ρAB ∥∥ ZXA (ρAB))] ,
(C23)
which requires no dilation in the Hilbert space at all.
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b. The linearized dual SDP
We also wish to show that the gradient ∇f(ρ)T , de-
fined in Eq. (B9), has a similar simple structure:
∇f(ρAB)T = S† (log2 S(ρAB))− S†
(
log2ZZAv (S(ρAB))
)
= p2Z
[
log2 ρAB − log2
(ZZA (ρAB))]
+ p2X
[
log2 ρAB − log2
(ZXA (ρAB))] .
(C24)
We start from the result of Eq. (C3):
S(ρAB) = |00〉〈00|AbBb ⊗ p2Zρz + |11〉〈11|AbBb ⊗ p2Xρx,
(C25)
thus
log2 (S(ρAB)) = |00〉〈00|AbBb ⊗ log2(p2Zρz)
+ |11〉〈11|AbBb ⊗ log2(p2Xρx),
(C26)
which gives us the first term before applying the adjoint
map S†. We can also obtain the second term (before the
adjoint map):
log2
(ZZAv (S(ρAB))) = |00〉〈00|AbBb ⊗ log2 (p2ZZZAv (ρz))
+ |11〉〈11|AbBb ⊗ log2
(
p2XZZAv(ρx)
)
.
(C27)
Now, let us apply the adjoint map to the first term
(Eq. (C26)):
S†(log2 (S(ρAB))) = (K¯0AK¯0B)† log2(p2Zρz)(K¯0AK¯0B)
+ (K¯1AK¯
1
B)
† log2(p
2
Xρx)(K¯
1
AK¯
1
B),
(C28)
where we have defined KiX = K¯
i
X ⊗ |i〉Xb for i ∈ { 0, 1 }
and X ∈ {A,B }. Explicitly,
K¯0AK¯
0
A = pZ
∑
i,j∈{ 0,1 }
|iZ〉Av |iZjZ〉〈iZjZ |AB, (C29)
and
K¯1AK¯
1
A = pX
∑
i,j∈{ 0,1 }
|iZ〉Av |iXjX〉〈iXjX |AB, (C30)
where we have used the shorthand: |0Z〉 = |0〉, |1Z〉 =
|1〉, |0X〉 = |+〉, |1X〉 = |−〉. In the previous section, we
have also shown that:
1. ρz in the Z-basis of Av and A is equivalent to ρAB
in the Z-basis, and
2. ρx in the Z-basis of Av and the X-basis of A is
equivalent to ρAB in the X-basis,
which are exactly the mapping described by the Kraus
operators in Eqs. (C29) and (C30). We therefore have
S†(log2 (S(ρAB))) = p2Z log2(p2ZρAB) + p2X log2(p2XρAB).
(C31)
Now, let us apply the adjoint map to the second term
(Eq. (C27)):
S† (log2 (ZZAv (S(ρAB))))
= (K¯0AK¯
0
B)
† log2
(
p2ZZZAv (ρz)
)
(K¯0AK¯
0
B)
+ (K¯1AK¯
1
B)
† log2
(
p2XZZAv (ρx)
)
(K¯1AK¯
1
B).
(C32)
Similarly, we have previously shown that:
1. ZZAv (ρz) in the Z-basis of Av and A is equivalent
to ZZA (ρAB) in the Z-basis, and
2. ZZAv (ρx) in the Z-basis of Av and the X-basis of A
is equivalent to ZXA (ρAB) in the X-basis.
Therefore,
S† (log2 (ZZAv (S(ρAB)))) = p2Z log2 (p2ZZZA (ρAB))
+ p2X log2
(
p2XZXA (ρAB)
)
.
(C33)
Combining Eqs. (C31) and (C33) give us:
∇f(ρAB)T = S† (log2 S(ρAB))− S†
(
log2ZZAv (S(ρAB))
)
= p2Z
[
log2(p
2
ZρAB)− log2
(
p2ZZZA (ρAB)
)]
+ p2X
[
log2(p
2
XρAB)− log2
(
p2XZXA (ρAB)
)]
= p2Z
[
log2 ρAB − log2
(ZZA (ρAB))]
+ p2X
[
log2 ρAB − log2
(ZXA (ρAB))] .
(C34)
To eliminate the factors of p2Z and p
2
X inside the log-
arithms we made use of a couple of properties of ma-
trix logarithm for a density matrix ρAB, which is a pos-
itive definite operator: ρAB ≻ 0 [59]. First, the fact
that log(A−1) = − logA for any A ≻ 0. Secondly, we
use the fact that ρAB commutes with ZZA (ρAB)−1 and
ZXA (ρAB)−1, as the pinched density matrices are diago-
nal in the basis they are pinched on. This concludes our
proof of the simplified form of ∇f(ρ)T .
2. Prepare-and-measure BB84
The simplification described here can be used for the
generic prepare-and-measure BB84 QKD protocol and
for the case with Trojan horse attack. The general pro-
cedure is similar to the procedure described in Sec. C 1,
so we will only show the important steps.
The Kraus operators related to Alice and Bob’s an-
nouncements are:
K0A = |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉Ab ⊗ |0〉Av + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉Ab ⊗ |1〉Av
K1A = |2〉〈2|A ⊗ |1〉Ab ⊗ |0〉Av + |3〉〈3|A ⊗ |1〉Ab ⊗ |1〉Av
K0B =
√
pZ
[|0〉〈0|B ⊗ |0〉Bb + |1〉〈1|B ⊗ |0〉Bb]
=
√
pZ IB ⊗|0〉Bb
K1B =
√
pX
[|+〉〈+|B ⊗ |1〉Bb + |−〉〈−|B ⊗ |1〉Bb]
=
√
pX IB ⊗|1〉Bb ,
(C35)
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where there is we did not keep track Bv. With the post-
selection operator Π = |0〉〈0|Ab ⊗ |0〉〈0|Bb + |1〉〈1|Ab ⊗|1〉〈1|Bb , we obtain:
S(ρAB) = |00〉〈00|AbBbpZρz + |11〉〈11|AbBbpXρx. (C36)
a. The key rate SDP
We will show that the key rate problem simplifies as
follows:
D
(S(ρAB) ∥∥ ZZAv (S(ρAB))) = pZD(ρ01AB ∥∥ ZZA (ρ01AB))
+ pXD
(
ρ23AB
∥∥ ZZA (ρ23AB)),
(C37)
where
ρ01AB =
∑
i,j={0,1}
|i〉〈j|A 〈i|ρAB|j〉A , (C38)
describing the upper-left block of ρAB in the standard
basis of A, i.e. in the {|0〉A, |1〉A} subspace. And,
ρ23AB =
∑
i,j={2,3}
|i〉〈j|A 〈i|ρAB|j〉A , (C39)
describing the lower-right block of ρAB in the standard
basis of A, i.e. in the {|2〉A, |3〉A} subspace.
Applying Lemma C.1 to D
(S(ρAB) ∥∥ ZZAv (S(ρAB))
gives us:
D
(S(ρAB) ∥∥ ZZAv (S(ρAB))) = pZD(ρz ∥∥ ZZAv (ρz))
+ pXD
(
ρx
∥∥ ZZAv (ρx)).
(C40)
We then write down ρz in the basis of Av and A:
ρz =
∑
i,j∈{ 0,1 }
|i〉A|i〉Av 〈j|A〈j|Av 〈i|ρAB|j〉A , (C41)
which is equivalent to the upper-left block of ρAB. Sim-
ilarly, applying the pinching channel on ρz gives us:
ZZAv (ρz) =
∑
i∈{ 0,1 }
|i〉A|i〉Av 〈i|A〈i|Av 〈i|ρAB|i〉A . (C42)
Thus, we conclude that
D
(
ρz
∥∥ ZZAv (ρz)) = D(ρ01AB ∥∥ ZZA (ρ01AB)). (C43)
Next, we can also write ρx:
ρx =
∑
i,j∈{ 2,3 }
|i〉A|i〉Av 〈j|A〈j|Av 〈i|ρAB|j〉A , (C44)
which is the lower-right block of ρAB. Applying the
pinching channel on ρx gives us:
ZZAv (ρx) =
∑
i∈{ 2,3 }
|i〉A|i〉Av〈i|A〈i|Av 〈i|ρAB|i〉A . (C45)
Finally,
D
(
ρx
∥∥ ZZAv (ρx)) = D(ρ23AB ∥∥ ZZA (ρ23AB)). (C46)
b. The linearized dual SDP
Here we will show that
∇f(ρAB)T = S† (log2 S(ρAB))− S†
(
log2ZZAv (S(ρAB))
)
= pZ
[
log2 ρ
01
AB − log2
(ZZA (ρ01AB))]
+ pX
[
log2 ρ
23
AB − log2
(ZZA (ρ23AB))] .
(C47)
The first term before the adjoint map S† is:
log2 (S(ρAB)) = |00〉〈00|AbBb ⊗ log2(pZρz)
+ |11〉〈11|AbBb ⊗ log2(pXρx).
(C48)
Applying the map:
S†(log2 (S(ρAB))) = (K¯0AK¯0B)† log2(pZρz)(K¯0AK¯0B)
+ (K¯1AK¯
1
B)
† log2(pXρx)(K¯
1
AK¯
1
B)
= pZ log2(pZρ
01
AB) + pX log2(pXρ
23
AB),
(C49)
as the Kraus operators are
K¯0AK¯
0
A =
√
pZ
∑
i,j∈{ 0,1 }
|iZ〉Av |iZjZ〉〈iZjZ |AB, (C50)
and
K¯1AK¯
1
A =
√
pX
∑
i∈{ 2,3 }
∑
j∈{ 0,1 }
|iZ〉Av |iZjX〉〈iZjX |AB.
(C51)
Similarly, the second term before the adjoint map is:
log2
(ZZAv (S(ρAB))) = |00〉〈00|AbBb ⊗ log2 (pZZZAv (ρz))
+ |11〉〈11|AbBb ⊗ log2
(
pXZZAv(ρx)
)
,
(C52)
and applying the map gives us
S† (log2 (ZZAv(S(ρAB))))
= (K¯0AK¯
0
B)
† log2
(
pZZZAv (ρz)
)
(K¯0AK¯
0
B)
+ (K¯1AK¯
1
B)
† log2
(
pXZZAv (ρx)
)
(K¯1AK¯
1
B)
= pZ log2
(
pZZZA (ρ01AB)
)
+ pX log2
(
pXZZA (ρ23AB)
)
.
(C53)
Combining Eqs. (C49) and (C53), and then eliminating
the probability terms inside the logarithms, we obtain
Eq. (C47).
3. B92
In analyzing the B92 protocol, we consider a simplified
postselection framework introduced in [5]. Let S be the
completely positive linear map corresponding to postse-
lection that is only given by a single Kraus operator S,
i.e. S(ρ) = SρS† such that S†S = I. In this case, we can
consider a new key rate problem:
H(ZA|E) = 1
ppass
D
S(ρAB)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
ZjAS(ρAB)ZjA
.
(C54)
20
In this case, let us define ρ˜AB ≡ S(ρAB) such that we can
translate the optimization problem to one that involves
ρ˜AB instead of ρAB, i.e.
min
ρAB
H(ZA|E) = min
ρAB
1
ppass
D
S(ρAB)
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
ZjAS(ρAB)ZjA

≡ min
ρ˜AB
1
ppass
D
ρ˜AB
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j
ZjAρ˜ABZ
j
A
,
(C55)
which can be solved using the SDP formulation without
postselection. Similarly, in the min-entropy formulation,
we have
min
ρAB
Hmin(ZA|E)
= − log2maxρAB maxσAB F
S(ρAB),∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A

+ log2 ppass
≡ − log2max
ρ˜AB
max
σAB
F
ρ˜AB,∑
j
ZjAσABZ
j
A

+ log2 ppass.
(C56)
The constraints for ρ˜AB can be computed from:
Tr(ρABΓi) = Tr(S
†SρABS
†SΓi)
= Tr(ρ˜ABSΓiS
†)
= Tr(ρ˜ABΓ˜i),
(C57)
where Γ˜i ≡ SΓiS†.
The Kraus operator for the postselection procedure is:
S = IA⊗
√
1
2
(|φ¯0〉〈φ¯0|B + |φ¯1〉〈φ¯1|B), (C58)
and the key maps are:
ZA = {|0〉〈0|A, |1〉〈1|A}. (C59)
Supplementary Note D: Other Examples
1. BB84 with Efficiency Mismatch
We again consider the entanglement-based BB84 pro-
tocol. However, we now quantify the efficiency of each of
Bob’s detectors. In the Z-basis, his detector efficiencies
are ηZ0 and ηZ1 , and in the X-basis, his detector effi-
ciencies are ηX0 and ηX1 . This is an asymmetric scenario
that one often encounters with practical QKD systems:
no two detectors have the same exact detection efficiency.
As has been suggested in Ref. [6], Bob’s measurement
operators are the same as in the entanglement-based pic-
ture, except we now model his system as a qutrit, where
the single photon exists in a single qubit subspace, and
the third dimension describes the vacuum which will con-
tribute to the no-click event. Bob’s Z-basis states are
{|0〉, |1〉, |∅〉} and his X-basis states are {|+〉, |−〉, |∅〉},
with 〈∅|0〉 = 〈∅|1〉 = 0.
We can model the problem with the following POVMs
for Alice:
M
(ab,av)
A ab av
pZ |0〉〈0| 0 0
pZ |1〉〈1| 0 1
pX |+〉〈+| 1 0
pX |−〉〈−| 1 1
Bob’s POVMs are
M
(bb,bv)
B bb bv
pZηZ0 |0〉〈0| 0 0
pZηZ1 |1〉〈1| 0 1
pXηX0 |+〉〈+| 1 0
pXηX1 |−〉〈−| 1 1
M∅B 2 0
Here,
M∅B = I−
1∑
i,j=0
M
(i,j)
B . (D1)
We generate keys from both the Z and X-bases using the
key-map POVM:
ZAv = {|0〉〈0|Av , |1〉〈1|Av}. (D2)
Similar to the previous example, we model the statis-
tics with a depolarizing channel:
ρ′AB = (IA⊗EdepB (p))(|ψ〉〈ψ|AB). (D3)
Due to the asymmetry in Bob’s measurements, in addi-
tion to the error constraints, we must also include the
constraints in which both parties measure the same val-
ues in the same basis. Thus, we have a total of four
coarse-grained constraints:
Γ
(=)
Z = pZ (ηZ0 |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B
+ηZ1 |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B) ,
Γ
(=)
X = pX (ηX0 |2〉〈2|A ⊗ |+〉〈+|B
+ηX1 |3〉〈3|A ⊗ |−〉〈−|B) ,
EZ = pZ (ηZ1 |0〉〈0|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B
+ηZ0 |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B) ,
EX = pX (ηX1 |+〉〈+|A ⊗ |−〉〈−|B
+ηX0 |−〉〈−|A ⊗ |+〉〈+|B) .
(D4)
The key rate in the asymptotic limit is simple if we
assume all detectors have the same efficiency. The situ-
ation is more interesting if we consider ηZ0 = ηX0 = η0
and ηZ1 = ηX1 = η1, in which there is detector efficiency
mismatch within a single basis. This QKD configuration
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has been treated analytically by [60] in the asymptotic
regime, and the key rate analytical formula derived is
r1 = min(η0, η1) [1− h2(Q)]− h2(Q). (D5)
The numerical analysis in the asymptotic limit has been
considered in Ref. [6].
Here, we consider this problem in the nonasymptotic
regime—taking into account the effects of statistical fluc-
tuations during the QKD operations. Similar to the case
of entanglement-based BB84, we assume equal security
parameter ε′, and the value of each relevant parameter is
tabulated in Tab. I. Fig. 7 plots the secret key rate per
pulse in terms of the number of pulses are generated by
Alice, assuming εsec = 10
−10 and εcor = 10
−15. We con-
sider the case where η0 = 1 and η1 = 25% or 75%. We see
that, in this case, the bound from von Neumann entropy
consistently outperforms the bound from min-entropy.
von Neumann entropy
min-entropy
FIG. 7: Secret key rate per pulse for the BB84 protocol cal-
culated using the von Neumann entropy (top) and the min-
entropy (bottom). We consider different values of error rate
Q and efficiency of the “1” detector η1. We assume that the
“0” detector has unit efficiency, i.e. η0 = 1. For all plots, the
lines are the results of our numerical method.
2. Trojan-horse attack
A common assumption for QKD analyses is that Eve
cannot access Alice’s laboratory. As its name suggests,
the Trojan-horse attack is a side-channel attack where
Eve tries to infiltrate Alice’s laboratory to obtain infor-
mation about the state Alice has sent towards Bob. In
particular, Eve uses the optical link between Alice and
Bob to launch a bright light pulse into Alice’s suppos-
edly secure module. The light pulse will reach Alice’s
encoding device and is encoded with the same informa-
tion, e.g. the phase value ϕ, as the signal prepared by
Alice. Some of these Trojan photons are reflected back
to Eve. Although the information ϕ is meant to be kept
private by Alice, Eve can perform measurements on these
back-reflected photons that may allow her to unambigu-
ously learn about the value of ϕ. At the end of the QKD
session, Eve can in principle obtain the same key as Alice
and Bob—without her presence being detected by either
Alice or Bob. The security of a QKD protocol can be
seriously compromised if components are not installed to
prevent these possible back-reflected lights. It has in fact
been shown that the phase values ϕ from an encoding de-
vice can be discriminated with higher than 90% success
probability using only three photons [61].
Different solutions have been proposed to counteract
the Trojan-horse attack. Alice could install an active
phase randomizer [62, 63] to remove the phase reference
from Eve’s hands or she could install a watchdog detec-
tor [64, 65] that alerts her when a bright pulse is injected
into her setup. Countermeasures can also be realized
with only passive components, e.g. optical fiber loops,
filters, and isolators, which are simple to implement and
to characterize experimentally [66].
The security against the Trojan-horse attack using
these passive countermeasures is based on the laser in-
duced damage threshold (LIDT) of the optical compo-
nents. Let us assume that Eve injects a coherent state
|√µin〉 with an average photon number µin into Alice’s
system. The Trojan photons will then acquire a phase
modulation information ϕ that will return to Eve as
|eiϕ√µout〉, where µout = γµin, with γ ≪ 1 describing
the isolation factor of Alice’s devices. If the value of
µin is unbounded, the QKD protocol is insecure against
a Trojan-horse attack. Fortunately, the value of µin is
bounded by the LIDT of Alice’s components.
Let us call N˙ the maximum number of photons per
second Eve is allowed to inject into Alice’s lab without
burning any of Alice’s components. We assume that Al-
ice has characterized this value of N˙ very well. For a
QKD system with a clock rate of f , Alice can assume the
worst case scenario in which Trojan photons with a mean
photon number µout = N˙γ/f are emitted back to Eve at
each transmission. Here, Alice has assumed that Eve dis-
tributes all her Trojan photons evenly in each round of
transmission. The validity of this assumption relies on
the convexity of the key rate as a function of µout, which
was shown in Ref. [66].
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Let us assume that Alice prepares the states she sends
to Bob using a single-photon source in the prepare-and-
measure scheme. She encodes her information in the
phase difference ϕ between the leading and the trailing
single-photon pulse. To model the Trojan-Horse Attack
in the BB84 protocol, we use the approach outlined in
Ref. [6]. In this case, the state she prepares can be writ-
ten as
|ψ〉ABE =
√
pZ
2
[|0〉A|φz+〉BE + |1〉A|φz−〉BE]
+
√
pX
2
[|2〉A|φx+〉BE + |3〉A|φx−〉BE] ,
(D6)
where
|φz±〉BE = |z±〉B |±
√
µout〉E
|φx±〉BE = |x±〉B|±i
√
µout〉E .
(D7)
Here, the states |z±〉 and |x±〉 are defined as
|z±〉 ≡ 1√
2
[|1〉l|0〉t ± |0〉l|1〉t] ,
|x±〉 ≡ 1√
2
[|1〉l|0〉t ± i|0〉l|1〉t] ,
(D8)
where |n〉l and |n〉t denote an n-photon state in the lead-
ing and trailing pulse, respectively. Here, pZ denotes
the probability she prepares a state in the Z-basis and
pX = 1− pZ denotes the probability she prepares a state
in the X-basis. She sends the B system to Bob, and Bob
measures his state either in the Z = {|0〉, |1〉} with prob-
ability pZ or in the X = {|+〉, |−〉} basis with probability
pX . For simplicity, we again assume Alice and Bob make
the their basis choices with the same probabilities pZ and
pX .
The protocol under consideration here is the prepare-
and-measure BB84, thus the measurement POVMs for
Alice are the standard basis:
M
(ab,av)
A ab av
|0〉〈0| 0 0
|1〉〈1| 0 1
|2〉〈2| 1 0
|3〉〈3| 1 1
and Bob’s POVMs are
M
(bb,bv)
B bb bv
pZ |z+〉〈z+| 0 0
pZ |z−〉〈z−| 0 1
pX |x+〉〈x+| 1 0
pX |x−〉〈x−| 1 1
We again consider the depolarizing channel to simulate
the statistics in our calculations:
ρ′AB = (IA⊗EdepB (p))TrE(|ψ〉〈ψ|ABE), (D9)
and we postselect for those cases where Alice and Bob
choose the same basis:
Π = |0〉〈0|Ab ⊗ |0〉〈0|Bb + |1〉〈1|Ab ⊗ |1〉〈1|Bb . (D10)
Due to the asymmetry of this problem, we must include
four constraints: two for the case when Alice and Bob
obtain the same values and two for the case when they
do not. They are
Γ
(=)
Z = pZ (|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B) ,
Γ
(=)
X = pX (|2〉〈2|A ⊗ |+〉〈+|B + |3〉〈3|A ⊗ |−〉〈−|B) ,
Γ
( 6=)
Z = pZ (|0〉〈0|A ⊗ |1〉〈1|B + |1〉〈1|A ⊗ |0〉〈0|B) ,
Γ
( 6=)
X = pX (|2〉〈2|A ⊗ |−〉〈−|B + |3〉〈3|A ⊗ |+〉〈+|B) .
(D11)
In addition to these constraints, we assume that Al-
ice has characterized her source well. In other words,
the state ρA = TrBE(ρABE) = TrB(ρ
′
AB) is known ex-
actly to her, such that we can add a set of tomographi-
cally complete observables {ΩjA} on system A, and also
add the calculated corresponding expectation values {ωj}
into the set of constraints. We add the constraints:
Tr
[
ρ′AB(Ω
j
A ⊗ IB)
]
= ωj , (D12)
which are known exactly with a failure probability of zero
even in the nonasymptotic regime. Since ρA is a valid
normalized density operator, we find the values of {ΩjA}
and {ωj} in our simulations by computing the spectral
decomposition of ρA =
∑
j pj|ψj〉〈ψj |A, such that ΩjA ≡
|ψj〉〈ψj |A and ωj ≡ pj . Under the Trojan-horse attack,
Alice’s state ρA is constrained to be the following:
ρA =
pZ/2 0 κ κ
∗
0 pZ/2 κ
∗ κ
κ∗ κ pX/2 0
κ κ∗ 0 pX/2
 , (D13)
where κ = 14 (1− i)
√
pZpX exp(−µout[1+ i]) and κ∗ is the
complex conjugate of κ.
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von Neumann entropy
min-entropy
FIG. 8: Nonasymptotic secret key rate per pulse for the BB84
protocol under a Trojan-horse attack for different values of
error rate Q and mean number of reflected Trojan photons
µout. The key rates are calculated using the von Neumann
entropy (top) and the min-entropy (bottom). All lines are
calculated using our numerical methods.
The key rate calculation for the asymptotic regime was
considered in Ref. [6]. We consider the nonasymptotic
regime, where we evaluate the security of an εsec-secret
and εcor-correct QKD protocol with εsec = 10
−10 and
εcor = 10
−15. The breakdown of the security parame-
ters are tabulated in Tab. I. Fig. 8 shows the secret key
rate as a function of the number of pulses sent by Alice.
The bounds from the von Neumann entropy calculations
outperform the bounds from the min-entropy except for
the case of zero QBER. We note this is the first time
nonasymptotic security of a QKD protocol under Trojan-
horse attack has ever been studied.
